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Some legal rules appear to have an almost irresistible intuitive appeal or
force of logic. To many corporate lawyers, the "internal affairs" doctrine-
the notion that only one state, almost always the site of incorporation, should
be authorized to regulate the relationships among a corporation and its
officers, directors, and shareholders-is irresistible if not logically inevitable.
Convenience and predictability of application, it is said,I dictate that one body
of corporate law govern internal affairs, while the most plausible state to
supply that law is the state of incorporation, to whose legislative grace the
corporation owes its legal existence. 2 The identity of that state is, after all,
more readily ascertainable and more constant than other states with which the
corporation and its constituents may have entanglements.
There is another long standing perspective on this question and other
related issues, however. An observation in Justice Marshall's opinion for the
majority in Shaffer v. Heitner,3 a case best known for its impact on permissible
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1. See, e.g., Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Internal Affairs: Choice of Law & the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1125 (1958); Ratner & Schwartz, The Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 641, 669 (1979); cf
Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94, 139-42
(arguing that even where uniformity of rule is necessary, state of incorporation need not be the
bellwether).
2. Another possible source of such law is federal law, were Congress to enact a federal
incorporation statute. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. The ramifications of such a move
transcend the modest scope of this essay.
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the Court held that a state's attempt to assert jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant must be evaluated against the minimum contacts standard articulated
in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Delaware compelled the presence of
defendants through its sequestration process, which enabled the seizure of shares of stock owned by
defendants in a Delaware company. The fact that the stock certificates were not present in Delaware
was not an obstacle to this process because by statute Delaware defined itself to be the situs of
ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations. 433 U.S. at 192. Defendants were notified by mail
and by publication of the fact of sequestration. Id. The Court held that the statutorily defined
presence of defendants' property in Delaware was an insufficient contact with the state to support the
assertion of jurisdiction and that the Delaware legislature had failed to assert explicitly that
defendants' other contacts with the state (such as their positions as officers and directors of a
Delaware corporation) constituted a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Delaware has
since enacted such a statute reaching corporate directors but not officers or shareholders. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1982).
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grounds for personal jurisdiction, suggests the alternative perspective.
Appellants in the case, nonresident directors of a Delaware corporation whose
headquarters were situated elsewhere, challenged the constitutionality of
Delaware's sequestration procedure. Justice Marshall wrote, "[a]ppellants
have simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware. ' '4 Technically, this
point is mistaken, as surely the corporation's directors were responsible for or
at least aware of the choice to incorporate in Delaware. Nevertheless, the
directors' relationship with Delaware was confined to the legal fact of the
company's incorporation there, and to some the overall insignificance of that
fact may have the same intuitive and irresistible force as does the internal
affairs doctrine to others. To be sure, when the subject matter of the
litigation concerns some matter other than the corporation's internal affairs,
the site of incorporation fades from insignificance to complete irrelevance.
For example, the fact of Delaware incorporation does not constrain the law
applicable to torts committed or contracts with third parties entered into by
Delaware corporations. 5 As this article later illustrates, the view that the state
of incorporation is relatively insignificant to internal affairs questions as well
has found many expressions, most notably in those state statutes that, as an
exercise in statutory outreach, mandate the application of local law to
specified internal affairs questions for certain foreign corporations.
The outreach statutes, along with the case law that achieves a similar
result, represent a counterculture to the mainstream choice of law approach
that has wholeheartedly embraced the internal affairs doctrine. The
mainstream approach is epitomized by the view expressed in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws: "[a]pplication of the local law of the state of
incorporation will usually be supported by those choice-of-law factors
favoring the needs of the interstate and international systems, certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified expectations
of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied." 6 This
article explores the consequences of the decision to substitute, partially or
wholly, for an unswerving adherence to the internal affairs doctrine, other
tactics for fixing the law applicable to internal affairs questions. The article
identifies a counterculture among corporation statutes to which these
departures from the internal affairs rule largely correspond. In addition, the
article considers conflicts among corporation statutes over internal affairs
matters. It concludes by examining the constitutionality of the application of
local law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations from the perspective of
the commerce and full faith and credit clauses.
4. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 301 (1971) (corporation's rights and
liabilities regarding third parties as to acts that could be done by an individual determined by choice
of law principles applicable to noncorporate persons).
6. Id. § 302 comment e; cf id. § 303 comment d (stressing importance of uniform treatment of
shareholders).
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STATUTORY LANDSCAPES AND CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Most states follow the traditional internal affairs doctrine, either through
case law or statutory provisions. About half of the states have enacted
provisions derived from the language of section 106 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, which provides:
A foreign corporation shall not be denied a certificate of authority by reason of the fact
that the laws of the state or country under which such corporation is organized
governing its organization and internal affairs differ from the laws of this State, and
nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the
organization or the internal affairs of such corporation.
7
While the language preceding the comma prohibits the state from
discriminating among foreign corporations in granting authorizations to do
business within the state, the language following the comma neatly
encapsulates the internal affairs doctrine.
Some states that have enacted provisions based on section 106, including
Connecticut,8 Louisiana, 9 and North Carolina,' 0 nevertheless have not
enacted the language after the comma. Although the statutes of these states
do not expressly require the application of any of these states' internal affairs
provisions to foreign corporations, and thus do not have an expressly
outreaching effect, the statutes do not prohibit such application. Apparently,
this omission was not inadvertent, at least in the case of NewJersey. The New
Jersey Commissioners' Comment to the statutory language that contains this
omission" states that "the Commission intentionally departed from the
'hands off' approach of [Model Business Corporation Act section 106] which,
had it been adopted, might have appeared to deny any authority whatever to
this State under this Revision to regulate the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation."' 12 As a consequence,
[New Jersey's] courts remain free under this Revision . . . to retain jurisdiction in
cases involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation and to grant relief on
equitable principles whenever indicated, even to the extent of applying to a foreign
corporation in a proper case certain substantive features of this Revision.'
3
Unfortunately, the Commissioners did not specify which features of the
statute should be so applied, and the subsequent New Jersey case law has not
pursued the invitation to apply local law.
As the New Jersey comment intimates, in a much earlier era the "internal
affairs" problem was seen as one of jurisdiction rather than choice of law;
courts were once thought to lack jurisdiction over actions involving the
internal affairs of foreign corporations.' 4 Once the jurisdictional impediment
7. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 106 (1971).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-396 (1960).
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:301 (1969).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-131(a) (1982).
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-2(2) (West 1969).
12. See id. Commissioners' Comment.
13. Id.
14. See Laity, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 144-45 (1955).
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fell, the question became whether a court should keep jurisdiction of an
internal affairs case or dismiss under the rubric of forum non conveniens. 15
Thus, only when these initial hurdles are passed does there arise the question
of what is the appropriate substantive law to be applied to internal affairs
issues that an action presents.
Some states have adopted statutory language that appears to be consistent
with the internal affairs doctrine, but this language does not expressly or
impliedly mandate the doctrine's application. For example, while Delaware
law has no counterpart to section 106 prohibiting its courts from applying
Delaware law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations, section 121(b) of
Delaware's General Corporation Law provides that "[e]very corporation shall
be governed by the provisions and be subject to the restrictions and liabilities
contained in this chapter."' 16 The statute thus directs that Delaware law be
applied to Delaware corporations, a directive presumably applicable not only
to Delaware courts but to courts of other jurisdictions as well. In some
respects, this requirement in the statute is unremarkable, for it is unlikely that
any state would express manifest disinterest in the law applicable to
corporations created pursuant to its corporation statute.
Two states, New York and California, have statutes that are explicitly
outreaching. These statutes expressly mandate the application of local law to
specified internal affairs questions in certain foreign corporations. The New
York statute makes applicable to foreign corporations doing business within
the state its provisions granting inspection rights to shareholders' 7 and its
provisions prescribing directors' liability for neglecting or otherwise violating
their duties to the management of the corporation's affairs 8 and for
authorizing illegal dividends,19 illegal stock repurchases 20 and illegal loans.
21
In addition, the provisions in the New York statute dealing with
indemnification and insurance for directors and officers, 22 imposing special
requirements on derivative litigation (including the security for expense
requirement), 23 and regulating mergers and consolidations 24 are expressly
made applicable to such foreign corporations. Foreign corporations are
exempt from all of these provisions if their shares are listed on a national
15. See id.
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (1983).
17. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1315(a) (McKinney 1963) (granting right to examine shareholders'
list). This right is made available only to New York residents who are shareholders of record of at
least five percent of any class of outstanding shares. The right to examine may be denied if the
stockholder fails to furnish an affidavit stating that inspection "is not desired for a purpose which is
in the interest of a business or object other than the business of the foreign corporation" and that the
shareholder has not sold or offered to sell, or aided and abetted a sale, of a shareholder list within the
past five years. Id. § 1315(b) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983-84).




22. Id. § 1319(4) (McKinney 1983).
23. Id. § 1319(3), (4).
24. Id. § 1319(6).
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securities exchange or if less than one half of the corporation's business
income during the preceding fiscal year was allocable to New York for
franchise tax purposes.
25
The California statute, in contrast, although less expansive in the range of
foreign corporations to which it applies, requires conformity with a more
extensive range of internal affairs provisions. Section 2115 of the California
Corporations Code defines the foreign corporations for which the California
statute has an outreach effect as those foreign corporations, half of whose
voting securities are held of record by persons with California addresses, that
also conduct half of their business in California as measured by a formula
weighing assets, sales and payroll factors. 26 Foreign corporations whose
securities are listed on a national stock exchange certified by the California
Commissioner of Corporations are exempt, however, as is a corporation if all
of its voting shares are owned by a corporation not subject to section 2115.27
Nonexempt foreign corporations falling within the outreach effect of the
California statute are subject to a fairly broad range of internal affairs
provisions. Among these internal affairs provisions are those provisions
requiring the annual election of all directors, providing that shareholders
have the right to vote their shares cumulatively in such elections, permitting
the removal of directors without cause, and specifying directors' duties to the
corporation. 28 In addition, foreign corporations within the section 2115
definition are also subject to the California provisions that limit corporate
indemnification of officers and directors, that regulate mergers,
reorganizations and sales of assets, and that grant rights to stockholders who
dissent from specified corporate transactions. 29 Section 2115 also makes
applicable to these foreign corporations the Code provisions defining
shareholders' rights to inspect,30 to obtain a list of shareholders, 31 and to
receive annual reports from the corporation.3 2 The inspection and reporting
sections themselves, moreover, contain outreach provisions making the
requirements of the sections applicable to an even broader range of foreign
corporations than that included in the section 2115 definition. As a result, the
inspection and reporting sections apply to foreign corporations having
principal executive offices in California or customarily holding board
25. Id. § 1320(a). The term "national securities exchange" is not defined by the statute.
Section 19(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, provides for registration as a national
securities exchange with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1981).
26. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
27. Id. § 2115(e). The securities exchanges that have been certified by the commissioner are the
American, New York, and Pacific Stock Exchanges. See CAL. ADMIN. REG. § 260.101.2, reprinted in 2
CORP. CURRENT STATUTES (P-H) at 262 (effective Oct. 18, 1979).
28. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
29. Id.
30. Id.; see id. § 1601 (1977). Section 1602 grants a similarly absolute right to corporate
directors to inspect corporate books and records. Id. § 1602.
31. Id. § 2115(b); see id. § 1600 (1977 & Supp. 1984). Section 1600(a) states that the right to
obtain a shareholder list is "absolute," unlike the New York provision that limits the shareholders'
right to obtain a shareholder list to those shareholders with appropriate purposes. See supra note 17.
32. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (1977 & Supp. 1984); see id. § 1501.
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meetings within the state, independent of the amount of business derived
from California sources or the number of shareholders residing in
California.
33
Enforcement of the outreach provisions of the California statute is
furthered by two provisions. Section 2108 requires that all foreign
corporations qualified to do business in California or subject to section 2115
file an annual statement detailing the percentage of their stockholders who
reside in California and the extent of their California-source income.3 4 The
Secretary of State may forfeit a foreign corporation's right to do business
within California if this statement is not filed after notice of failure to file has
been given.3 5 Section 1508 permits California's Attorney General to institute,
maintain or intervene in suits alleging that a foreign or domestic corporation
has failed to comply with certain portions of the Code, including the annual
meeting and cumulative voting requirements.
36
In contrast to the certainty with which the state of incorporation may be
determined, the criteria upon which the applicability of section 2115 hinges
are not constants. For example, whether half of a corporation's business is
derived from California and whether half of its voting securities have record
holders with California addresses may well vary from year to year (and indeed
throughout any given year). Thus, a corporation might be subject to section
2115 one year but not the next, depending on its situation at the time of filing
the annual statement required by section 2108.
Both the New York and California statutes mandate the application of local
law to foreign corporations that could have significant economic connections
with states other than New York and California. Although some authorities
have advocated the application of local law to the internal affairs of foreign
corporations, they emphasize primarily the "pseudo-foreign" corporation:
one whose existence, apart from the legal fact of foreign incorporation, is
confined to one state. 37 "Pseudo-foreign" corporations are enterprises
"essentially local in character" whose business and personnel are
predominantly identified with one state. 38 Their out-of-state incorporation
makes them "tramp corporations," it is occasionally said, 39 in contexts in
which this description connotes a carpetbagger or scofflaw rather than a
corporate Huckleberry Finn. In any event, the New York and California
outreach provisions are not confined to such "tramp corporations" and
33. See id. §§ 1501(g), 1600(d), 1601(a).
34. Id. § 2108(a) (1977).
35. Id. § 2108(d).
36. Id. § 1508.
37. See Laity, supra note 14. In contrast, the "quasi-foreign" corporation, although its ties to the
state of incorporation consist solely of the fact of incorporation, does business in two or more states
and has ties with two or more states that are substantially equivalent. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations
and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 439 (1968).
38. See Latty, supra note 14, at 137.
39. See, e.g., Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling Upon the Tramp, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85 (1977).
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clearly apply to some corporations with real economic existences in other
states.
In contrast to New York and California, other states have less aggressive
outreach provisions that, although purporting to apply local law to the
internal affairs of foreign corporations, do so in less systematic or expansive
fashion. A few states, for example, make statutory assertions that foreign
corporations, as to contracts made or business done within the state, shall be
subject to the same liabilities, limitations and regulations as companies
incorporated within the state, and shall enjoy no greater privileges or powers
than the state's own corporations. 40 Depending on a court's willingness to
construe "doing business" to include internal affairs activities such as holding
shareholder meetings within the state, these statutes may support the
legitimacy of regulation through local law. The Maryland corporation law
contains a provision of potentially broader scope; it asserts that "[bly doing
intrastate, interstate, or foreign business in this State, a foreign corporation
assents to the laws of this State. ' 4 ' No case law reveals how broad the
legislature intended this assent to be. In particular, it is unclear whether this
assent extends to the entirety of Maryland's corporation statute. Finally,
Texas adopted the language of section 106 of the Model Business
Corporation Act in its entirety, but qualified its statute with the proviso that
"nothing in this act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to
regulate the organization of such corporation or its internal affairs not
intrastate in Texas." 42 One leading authority has suggested that this proviso
might be combined with another section of the statute subjecting officers and
directors of foreign corporations to the same "duties, restrictions, penalties
and liabilities" as their Texas counterparts43 to mean that internal affairs
activities may be regulated by the full range of provisions in the Texas
corporation statute.4
4
The divergence in statutory approaches to the internal affairs question is
paralleled by a richly varied body of case law. In some states, of course, courts
have consistently adhered to the internal affairs doctrine, departing from it
only when the foreign corporation had no contacts with its state of
incorporation other than the legal fact of its organization under that state's
corporation statute. In other jurisdictions, however, at least as to some
internal affairs issues, courts have taken a more expansive view of the
applicability of local law to foreign corporations. These courts have taken
jurisdiction over such cases and have applied local law to resolve disputes
40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-227 (1984); ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 11. However, Alabama has
also adopted language comparable to MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 106 (1971). See ALA. CODE § 10-
2A-226 (1984).
41. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 7-105 (1975).
42. See TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-8.01 (Vernon 1979) (emphasis added).
43. Id. art. 1396-8.02.
44. See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1958, at 363, 397.
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about such quintessentially internal matters as shareholders' inspection
rights, dividend practices, elections, and directors' liability to the corporation.
The inspection cases use a variety of rationales to justify the application of
forum-state law. Some older cases reason simply that a shareholder's right to
inspect books and records is guaranteed by the common law and permit the
inspection of a foreign corporation's books and records on that basis alone.45
More recent cases have used the more elaborate rationale that a foreign
corporation, by entering a state and doing business in it, impliedly accepts the
conditions placed by local law upon doing business in the state, including
requirements that corporate books and records be made available for
inspection. 46 A few cases have supplemented this reasoning with the corollary
argument that no foreign corporation has rights or privileges superior to
those granted to similar domestic corporations. 47 Some courts also examine
whether the plaintiff would be without remedy if the relief requested were not
given.48 Finally, some courts simply assert that disputes over inspection do
not involve internal affairs, thereby pretermitting the question of the internal
affairs doctrine.49
One aspect of the inspection cases that is a common theme in all internal
affairs cases involving foreign corporations is the issue of the tribunal's ability
to grant effective relief and award an enforceable decree. Obviously, a serious
45. See, e.g., Nettles v. McConnell, 151 Ala. 538, 43 So. 838 (1907); State ex rel. Gilbert, Eliott &
Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 90 Conn. 638, 98 A. 580 (1916); Wise v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 285 Ill.
App. 40, 1 N.E.2d 536 (1936); Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N.E. 764 (1915);
Andrews v. Mines Corp., 205 Mass. 121, 91 N.E. 122 (1910); Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson
Co., 250 Minn. 265, 84 N.W.2d 919 (1957); State ex rel. English v. Lazarus, 127 Mo. App. 401, 105
S.W. 780 (1907); Siravo v. Sirian Lamp Co., 124 N.J.L. 433, 12 A.2d 682 (1940); State ex rel. Grismer
v. Merger Mines Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 417, 101 P.2d 308 (1940). But cf Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n, 14 App. Cas. 154, 43 L.R.A. 390 (D.C. 1899); Commonwealth ex rel. Kinney v. Mexican
Plantation Co., 19 Pa. D. 861 (1910), overruled by Conerty v. Butler County Oil Refining Co., 301 Pa.
417, 152 A. 672 (1930); Taylor v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 97 Va. 60, 33 S.E. 385 (1899)
(court refused to take jurisdiction of action involving internal affairs of foreign corporation).
46. See, e.g., Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941); People ex rel.
Hollingshead v. American Discount Co., 332 Il1. 18, 163 N.E. 479 (1928); McCormick v. Statler
Hotels Del. Corp., 55 111. App. 2d 21, 203 N.E.2d 697 (1964); State ex rel. Watkins v. North Am. Land
& Timber Co., 106 La. 621, 31 So. 172 (1902); State ex rel. Smalley v. Stems Tire & Tube Co., 202
S.W. 459 (Mo. App. 1918); American Shipbuilding Co. v. Whitney, 19 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 584, 36 Ohio
C.C. 668, revd on other grounds, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 12, 23 Ohio Dec. 1 (1912); Toklan Royalty Corp. v.
lilltanv, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943): State ex rel. Quinn v. Thompson's Malted Food Co.,
160 Wis. 671, 152 N.W. 458 (1915).
47. See. e.g.. People ex rel. Hollingshead v. American Discount Co., 332 Ill. 18, 23, 163 N.E. 479,
481-82 (1928); State ex rel. Smalley v. Sterns Tube & Tire Co., 202 S.W. 459, 459-60 (Mo. App.
1918); American Shipbuilding Co. v. Whitney, 19 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 584, 585, 36 Ohio C.C. 668, 669-
70, rovd on other grounds 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 12, 23 Ohio Dec. 1 (1943); Toklan Royalty Corp. v.
Tifl'ans. 193 Okla. 120, 122, 141 P.2d 571, 573-74 (1943); State ex rel. Quinn v. Thompson's Malted
F"ood C'o., 160 Wis. 671, 674, 152 N.W. 458, 459 (1915).
48. See. e.g.. Nettles v. McConnell, 151 Ala. 538, 542, 43 So. 838, 839 (1907); State ex rel.
Richardson v. Swift. 7 Houst. 137, 152, 30 A. 781, 783 (Del. Super. Ct. 1885), afd, 12 Del. 338, 6 A.
856 (1886); Appleton v. Worne Plastics Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 324, 330-31, 54 A.2d 612, 616-17 (NJ.
Ch. 1947).
49. See, e.g., State ex ret. Gilbert, Eliott & Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 90 Conn. 638, 642, 98 A.
580, 581 1916): McCormick v. Statler Hotels Del. Corp., 55 I11. App. 2d 21, 34, 203 N.E.2d 697, 703
(1964): Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 164, 74 A.2d 160, 162 (1950); Polakoff v.
Marchand College of Chiropractic, 8 Pa. D. & C. 71, appeal quashed, 287 Pa. 28, 134 A. 529 (1926).
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difficulty arises when enforcement of the court's order would require
extraterritorial action. Indeed, the practical significance of the "outreach"
statutes may be a function, first, of whether jurisdiction over the defendants is
available in the state with such a statute, and, second, of whether any other
state would give effect to the outreach statute if jurisdiction over the
defendants is available only in that other state.
50
In most of the inspection cases, courts carefully emphasize that the
inspection rights created by local law apply only to those books and records
within their respective jurisdictions. 5' In a few cases, courts ordered
inspection of books and records not then within their jurisdiction that
previously had been within the state. 52 In the remarkable Pennsylvania case
of Tierney v. Indian Ridge Coal & Coke Co., however, the court applied local law
to compel inspection of the books and records of a West Virginia corporation
despite the fact that the corporation maintained no office and did no business
in Pennsylvania. 53 In that case, some of the corporation's officers resided in
Pennsylvania (where they kept copies of some of the corporate records) and
used a Pennsylvania bank to keep some corporate accounts. 54 The court
apparently relied upon these contacts to compel inspection even though there
was no showing that the plaintiff would otherwise be without a remedy.
Relatively few cases apply local law to dividend disputes in foreign
corporations, perhaps because the question of whether to declare a dividend
is, with the exception described below, relegated to the business judgment of
the corporation's directors if the corporation's financial health meets basic
tests established by statute. Unlike the prescription of shareholders'
inspection rights, the regulation of dividends may affect the interests of the
corporation's creditors as well as those of its internal constituencies and may
thus implicate the interests of the state in protecting the contractual
expectations of its citizens as the foreign corporation's creditors. On the
other hand, although a corporation's creditors undoubtedly have an interest
in preserving its assets against inordinate dividend payments, intracorporate
relationships are also affected by dividend policies. The directors'judgments
about dividends define economic prerogatives of the common stockholders in
relation to any preferred shares; further, by statute, apart from the
contractually defined claims of preferred stock, directors' business judgments
about dividend matters are generally not amenable to stockholder challenge.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 177-78.
51. See, e.g., Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 426, 199 So. 854, 856 (1941); Nettles v.
McConnell, 151 Ala. 538, 545, 43 So. 838, 840 (1907); McCormick v. Statler Hotels Del. Corp., 55
Ill. App.2d 21, 33-34, 203 N.E.2d 697, 703 (1964); State ex rel. Watkins v. North Am. Land & Timber
Co., 106 La. 621, 633-34, 31 So. 172, 177 (1902); Andrews v. Mines Corp., 205 Mass. 121, 123, 91
N.E. 122, 123 (1910); Appleton v. Worne Plastics Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 324, 330-31, 54 A.2d 612, 617
(N.J. Ch. 1947); Donna v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 399 Pa. 497, 161 A.2d 13 (1960); Tiernev v. Indian
Ridge Coal & Coke Co., 256 Pa. 340, 341, 100 A. 814, 815 (1917); Polakoff v. Marchand College of
Chiropractic, 8 Pa. D. & C. 71, 72, appeal quashed, 287 Pa. 28, 134 A. 529 (1926).
52. See, e.g., Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of Am., 37 Il. 2d 599, 229 N.E.2d 536 (1967):
People ex rel. Hollingshead v. American Discount Co., 332 Ill. 18, 26, 163 N.E. 479, 483 (1928).
53. See Tierney v. Indian Ridge Coal & Coke Co., 256 Pa. 340, 341, 100 A. 814, 815 (1917).
54. See id.
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In International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, the dispute
concerned Wisconsin's right, through its "dividend privilege" tax, to tax or
otherwise regulate dividends paid to shareholders out of earnings derived
from Wisconsin sources. 5 5 The Supreme Court held that "Wisconsin may
impose a measure of control upon the corporation there with respect to
withdrawal of its earnings from the state, and also may, for protection of the
interests of the state and of its citizens, regulate to some extent the
declaration and distribution of dividends by a foreign corporation, certainly
with respect to Wisconsin earnings."-56 Justice Jackson's dissent argued that
Wisconsin was, through the allocation of earnings in its tax scheme between
common and preferred stock, altering "the purely internal relations of
different classes of stockholders without in the least affecting their relation to
creditors."
57
A more provocative, albeit hypothetical, instance of outreaching dividend
regulation arises under an unusual provision in the North Carolina corporate
statute entitling a twenty percent stockholder in a close corporation to compel
the declaration and payment of a dividend from earnings under some financial
circumstances. 58 In light of the fact that North Carolina is also a state that has
from time to time taken a generous view of its ability to regulate the internal
affairs of foreign corporations, 59 it is possible that a court might determine
that the statute's unusual mandatory dividend right should be made available
to North Carolina stockholders in a foreign corporation.
Disputes over the election of directors involve corporate "internal affairs"
in a fashion more obviously exclusive of the interests of creditors and the state
than do disputes over dividend payments. This fact, however, has not
prevented courts from taking jurisdiction over cases litigating election
disputes in foreign corporations and applying local law to resolve the election
contest. Most of the cases involve the use of local mandamus statutes to
compel a director to relinquish his office and any corporate papers to his
successor.60 While in most such instances the court appears to have been
merely enforcing a right already determined by the law of the state of
incorporation, the court was moved to act by what it perceived to be a lack of
remedy in the state of incorporation. The failure of remedy arose because the
state of incorporation lacked jurisdiction over the offending party who refused
to relinquish his office and turn over the corporation's books and records to
his successor.
6 1
55. See International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
56. Id. at 442.
57. Id. at 449 (Jackson. J., dissenting).
58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(l) (1982).
59. See, e.g., Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store, 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959).
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ryan v. Cronan, 23 Nev. 437, 49 Pac. 41 (1897); State ex rel. Curtis v.
McCullough, 3 Nev. 181 (1867); Beard v. Beard, 66 Or. 512, 133 P. 797 (1913); General Sherman
Consol. Gold Mines, Ltd. v. Burris, 172 Wash. 142, 19 P.2d 665 (1933).
61. See, e.g., State ex rel. Curtis v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 181, 193-94 (1867); Beard v. Beard, 66 Or.
512, 517, 133 P. 797, 799 (1913); General Sherman Consol. Gold Mines, Ltd. v. Burris, 172 Wash.
142, 146, 19 P.2d 665, 666 (1933).
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Probably the most striking application of local law to an election dispute is
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, a California case predating the statute
discussed above.62 The controversy in Western Air Lines began when minority
stockholders in a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
California voted their shares cumulatively, as the corporation's certificate of
incorporation permitted, and thereby elected two directors. 63 The board of
directors thereafter voted to enlarge the board by two members and to amend
the corporation's certificate to eliminate cumulative voting. As the
amendment required shareholder approval, proxy forms were sent to
stockholders soliciting their votes in favor of the amendment abolishing
cumulative voting, and a sizable majority of the shareholders voted in favor of
the abolition. 64 Meanwhile, California's Corporations Commissioner took the
position that the amendment constituted a "sale" of Western Air Lines'
securities. 65 Under the California Corporation Code, prior to selling its own
securities a company was required to obtain a permit from the Commissioner,
who was authorized by the Code to approve the fairness of the "terms and
conditions" of the sale.66 The Commissioner denied the required permit on
the grounds that the elimination of cumulative voting rights was unfair to
Western's stockholders, over thirty percent of whom resided in California. 67
The controversy went to the Court of Appeal, which held, in essence, that the
Commissioner had discretion to disregard the applicable Delaware law in
favor of California's statutory mandate of cumulative voting in elections for
directors. 68 The decision was based in part on the fact that Western Air Lines
had first become entangled with the Commissioner's authority many years
earlier when it sought permission to exchange shares in the Delaware
corporation for those in its California predecessor and represented that the
exchange would not injure the California stockholders. 69 In the court's view,
however, the Commissioner's exercise of visitorial powers over a foreign
corporation was justified as well by Western Air Lines' commercial presence
within California. 70
The cases in which courts have applied local law to impose liability on
directors and officers for breaches of duties owed the corporation appear
primarily to be instances in which the corporation's economic activities were
situated exclusively in the forum state. As a result, a court in such a case
could characterize the corporation's relationship with its state of
incorporation, as did the court in State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co.,
62. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
63. Id. at 401, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
64. Id. at 401-02, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
65. Id. at 401-03, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720-22.
66. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500 (1947) (current version Cal. Corp. Code § 25110 (1977)).
67. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191, Cal. App. 2d 399, 402-04, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719,
721-22 (1961).
68. See id. at 410-12, 12 Cal Rptr. at 726-28.
69. Id. at 411-12, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
70. Id. at 412-13, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
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as "more atmospheric, than real." 7 1 In Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, the directors and majority shareholders of a Delaware corporation
were held to have breached a fiduciary relationship imposed by Louisiana law
on behalf of the minority stockholders because they attempted to buy out the
minority without disclosing that the corporation was to be liquidated at
tremendous profit to the remaining shareholders. 72 The court found that
although Delaware law imposed no fiduciary obligation on the majority-a
proposition with which later Delaware cases would disagree-and although
the defendants' actions were consistent with the corporation's charter, the
defendants had breached an obligation imposed by Louisiana law. The court
held that Louisiana law applied to define the parties' relationships because the
corporation's economic existence was limited to that state and its contact with
Delaware was limited to the fact of its incorporation there.
73
III
CONFLICTS AMONG CORPORATION STATUTES
The outreach statutes and the case law approach epitomized by Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski would be merely a formal curiosity if corporation statutes
were uniform in their treatment of internal affairs matters. But they are not;
potentially, a corporation may be subject to conflicting (or at least different)
statutory provisions from the corporation statute of its state of incorporation
and from the applicable provisions of the corporation statute of the state
subjecting it to regulation as a foreign corporation. The precise nature of
these differences and conflicts varies considerably, at least in part because
corporation statutes differ not only in detail but in basic assumptions about
the appropriate regulatory force of the statute itself and about the allocation
of prerogatives and risks within the corporation.
Because contemporary corporation statutes have provisions serving
diverse functions, conflicts arise from the fact that each statute is itself
heterogeneous and may treat a particular matter differently from the statute
of any other state. Each statute contains provisions that may be classified as
facilitative, suppletory, mandatory, and prohibitive. The potential for
conflicts among statutes can be illustrated by examples from each of these
categories.
Substantial portions of all corporation statutes are enabling or facilitative.
These portions enable the organizers of the corporation to make their own
agreement and embody it in the corporation's constitutional documents.
Subject to later amendment through the process specified by statute, the
corporation after its creation functions as the product of such private
decisions or agreements. Facilitative provisions of corporation statutes also
have a channeling function, in that they specify which private agreements or
71. See State ex reL Weede v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 807, 2 N.W.2d 372, 386, modified, 4
N.W.2d 869 (1942).
72. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959).
73. Id. at 320-21.
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decisions about business entities and associations will be favored with the full
legal apparatus of corporate form, including the significant fact of limited
liability. A simple example of a facilitative statutory provision is the
"Declaration of Purposes" requirement, through which the purposes toward
which the new corporation's legal powers may be used are specified by the
organizing parties in the charter.7 4
Some statutory provisions that are enabling in that they permit
enforcement of the parties' own choices, are also suppletory because they
furnish a statutory standard that will govern if the parties fail to make their
own specification. Thus, if the parties fail to agree on an alternative to the
statutory standard, or if they prefer the statutory standard to the alternatives,
their relationship on this matter is governed by the gap-filling provision in the
statute. Many states' provisions concerning shareholder and director voting
are an easy example of suppletory provisions that provide a statutory standard
but permit some degree of variation by the parties. Under the Delaware
statute, for example, all shareholder and director votes are subject to a simple
majority norm, but the certificate of incorporation or bylaws may require
greater majorities on all questions or those particular questions specified by
the parties.
75
Even at this level of statutory permissiveness, conflicts of a sort are
possible between corporation statutes because the standards specified in the
suppletory provisions may differ or, put differently, the various statutes
embody differing presumptions about the rule that should govern in the
absence of alternative provision by the parties. While a given result may
require drafting out of the statutory standard in one state, it may represent
the statutory norm in another state. Thus, achieving the result the parties
desire obviously requires competent counseling, planning, and drafting.
An example of this kind of problem stems from the varying statutory
treatments of the allocation of bylaw powers between directors and
shareholders. The statute's resolution of the issue of bylaw power represents
a basic decision about internal corporate governance because it embodies the
residual power over most of the corporation's internal arrangements, which
tend to be specified by the bylaws, such as the authorized number of directors.
Statutes differ widely in their standard allocation of bylaw power. In
Delaware, shareholders are granted bylaw power by statute; directors have no
power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws unless it is granted by the certificate,
provided that no such grant may reduce the shareholders' power. 76 At most,
directors may achieve bylaw power coequal with that of the shareholders. In
California, shareholders and directors are initially vested with coequal power
but the articles or bylaws may limit or restrict the board's bylaw power. 77 The
74. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 54(c) (1971) ("The articles of incorporation shall set
forth . . . [t]he purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized .... .
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 216 (1983).
76. See id. § 109.
77. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (1977).
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Illinois statute grants coequal bylaw power to shareholders and directors
unless some reservation to shareholders has been made in the articles. 7a
These statutes embody different statutory presumptions that, absent contrary
provision by the parties, control the allocation of internal governance powers.
Thus, the conflict at this level is in the nature of the drafting burden.
Corporation statutes also contain mandatory provisions and expressly or
implicitly prohibitory provisions. These types of provisions are the most
fertile ground for conflict if a corporation is subjected to the statutory
directives of more than one state. Although contemporary corporation
statutes contain fewer such provisions than their predecessors, 79 each statute
treats some topics-not always the same ones-in a mandatory or prohibitory
fashion. Sometimes, a given corporation can resolve this kind of conflict
simply by complying with the more restrictive of the two statutes. Conflicting
dividend regulation is an example; one state may impose a more rigorous or
exacting test on a proposed payment to shareholders than does the law of the
other state.
Comparing the treatment of dividends in the California and Delaware
statutes reveals numerous variations. In both states, it is illegal for a
corporation to make a dividend payment that would leave it unable to pay its
debts as they become due.80 Delaware uses the traditional "balance sheet"
test which examines whether a proposed payment can be charged to any
surplus account, including paid-in surplus.8 1 Even if the balance sheet does
not show sufficient surplus, Delaware also permits the declaration of a
dividend out of net profits for the current or preceding fiscal year (the
"nimble dividend").8 2 The test in California is more complicated and is more
restrictive in some but not all instances. Under the California statute, a
dividend is legal if it equals the amount of retained earnings prior to the
distribution, or if after the distribution the corporation's assets equal one-
and-one-quarter times its liabilities and its current assets equal current
liabilities (or one-and-one-quarter times liabilities if interest expense has
exceeded pretax earnings for the two prior fiscal years).8 3 Thus, the legality
of a proposed dividend payment could vary depending upon whether
Delaware's or California's statute was applied. The conflict can be resolved by
comparing the statutes' assessments of the legality of a given payment, under
the corporation's financial circumstances at the time, and then complying with
78. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 2.25 (Smith-Hurd 1984).
79. See Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409 (1968); Latty, Why
Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965). Professor Folk
emphasizes the difficulty of reaching agreement on the content of a more "regulatory" corporation
statute, Folk, supra, at 420, and Dean Latty notes that while regulatory or "protective" statutes are
frequently quite complex, enabling statutes have a "beautiful simplicity." Latty, supra, at 615. In any
event, the ease of foreign incorporation permits evasion of more regulatory statutes. Id. at 611.
80. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (1977); cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (1975) (conveyance
fraudulent as to creditors if made by person who is insolvent or is made so by conveyance).
81. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1983).
82. See id.
83. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (1977 & Supp. 1984).
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the restrictions of the more parsimonious test. Accurate execution of this
comparison, however, requires knowledge of the applicable statutory tests
and facility in using them, or, more simply, larger payments to accountants
and lawyers than if only one statute's regulation were evidently applicable. In
any event, nothing in the Delaware statute, which is in most instances the
more generous of the two, requires that dividends be declared to the full extent
of their statutory legality.
Some other possible conflicts are not so readily soluble. The variation in
statutory treatments of cumulative voting presents an example. In
Delaware, 84 and under the Model Business Corporation Act, 85 cumulative
voting is permitted but not mandated. The statutory norm in Delaware is
straight voting unless the certificate of incorporation provides for cumulative
voting.8 6 In California8 7 (and about twenty other states),8 8 cumulative voting
is mandatory and may not be "written out" by the parties in a certificate
provision specifying the use of straight voting. 89 Thus, if one supposes that a
Delaware corporation without a certificate provision electing cumulative
voting is subject to California's statutory mandate through section 2115, it is
not wholly satisfactory to say that the corporation can resolve the conflict by
complying with the "more restrictive" statutory regimen. For which is more
restrictive?
Whether shareholders have the right to vote cumulatively, so that holders
of sizable minority blocks may elect a director, is not a choice that can be
analyzed in terms of relative restrictiveness. Nor can it be seen as a pro- or
anti-stockholder, pro- or anti-management choice. Cumulative voting affects
the allocation of voting power as between majority stockholders and sizable
but noncontrolling minority interests. Indeed, if the Delaware corporation's
choice not to elect cumulative voting was a considered decision, it represents
a choice to further the interest of one group of stockholders (the majority)
over the others (large minority blocks). If this choice is the product of a
bargain between the company's stockholders about the allocation of voting
power amongst themselves, then that bargain is abrogated when the
corporation is compelled to comply with the mandatory cumulative voting
provisions in the California statute. The conflict, then, is between the voting
arrangements made by private parties through an agreement permitted by
one statute and another statute's inconsistent mandate. To be sure, present
stockholders of the corporation may argue that they were not parties to the
original agreement to use straight voting and thus are not bound by it. In
addition, original stockholders may argue that they no longer agree with the
majority and thus should be allowed to vote cumulatively to place their
champion on the board. But the risk of enforced acquiescence in prior
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212, 214 (1983).
85. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 33 (1971).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1983).
87. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 708(a), (b), (c) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
88. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 33 4 comment 3.03 (Supp. 1977).
89. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
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choices made by others-or for that matter by oneself-is a standard
contractual risk of buying or owning less than a controlling share of a
corporation. Is the risk of not being able to vote cumulatively any different?
In any event, even worse conflicts over cumulative voting are conceivable.
At least two states, Massachusetts 90 and New Hampshire, 9' appear not to
authorize the practice. A rationale behind this position, which seems at least
as compelling as the rationales supporting statutory compulsion of cumulative
voting, is that directors are better able to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to
the corporation and the shareholding body as a whole if they are not blatantly
identifiable with particular constituencies among the stockholders. Indeed,
the board may be better able to function as a cohesive body-whether to
manage or to superintend the management efforts of others-if its members
do not include the representatives of minority factions of stockholders.
These statutory goals cannot be dismissed lightly as ill-conceived or unduly
permissive, but California's assertion of internal affairs power through section
2115 purports to require that subject corporations disregard such policies of
their state of incorporation.
Another serious conflict in internal affairs provisions arises from the
variations in treatment of removal of directors from office prior to the
expiration of their terms. In some states, a court could likely remove
directors from office,92 and probably in most states a majority of the
stockholders could do so as well,9 3 upon a sufficient showing of cause for
removal. States differ, however, on the removal of directors without cause, that
is, without any showing that directors have been faithless as fiduciaries or
especially inept as managers.
Delaware and California, once again, differ somewhat in their treatment of
removal without cause. Although directors may be removed for cause in both
states, 94 only in California may directors always be removed without cause by a
majority vote of the stockholders, subject to the protection of stockholders'
cumulative voting rights.95 A director cannot be removed without cause if the
number of shares cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if
voted cumulatively in an election for the entire number of directors elected at
90. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 32 (West 1979).
91. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 294, § 85 (1978). The relevant language of the New
Hampshire statute provides that "[u]nless the articles of agreement on the votes authorizing the
issue of the stock shall otherwise provide, stockholders shall have one vote for each share of stock
owned by them." Although the New Hampshire position has been equated to that of Massachusetts,
see MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 33 4 comment 3.04 (1971), the statutory language at least
suggests the possibility that cumulative voting might be authorized in the articles. Nothing in the
statute refers to the mechanisms of cumulative voting, however, making it likely that § 85 refers to
the creation of shares with unequal voting power rather than a general cumulative voting scheme. As
New Hampshire does not authorize removal of directors without cause, the statute's failure to refer
to the preservation of cumulative voting rights in the removal context is of less moment.
92. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 39 comment 4.03 (1971).
93. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 142 (5th ed. 1980).
94. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (1977) (authorizing suit brought by at least ten percent of
the stockholders to seek director's removal for cause by Superior Court), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(k) (majority of stockholders may remove director for cause).
95. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 303 (1977).
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the same time as the director facing removal. 96 In effect, if the director still
has the support of the block of shares that originally elected him, he cannot be
removed. Further, like the stockholders' right to vote cumulatively, the right
to remove directors by majority vote cannot be modified or altered through
certificate provisions. 97 In contrast, under the Delaware statute, if there is no
certificate provision granting the right to remove without cause, shareholders
have the right to remove directors without cause only if the board is not
classified, in other words, only if all directors' terms expire at the same time.98
Thus, if the board is classified, and nothing in the certificate permits removal
without cause, directors in a Delaware corporation cannot be removed
without a showing of cause. Obviously, the conflict between the California
and Delaware provisions is substantial if section 2115 mandates the
application of California's removal rights to a Delaware corporation.
Two further complications may arise. First, while the California statute, by
requiring that all directors be elected annually, 99 appears to prohibit a
Delaware corporation subject to section 2115 from staggering the terms of its
directors, it allows the division of shares into classes and the election of a
designated number of directors by those classes.' 00 Second, classified shares
may reduce the force of shareholders' right to vote cumulatively and to
remove directors, by reducing the numbers of directors for whom a particular
stockholder is entitled to vote and whom he may seek to remove.' 01 If parties
are aware of this possibility and use it carefully, they may vitiate the force of
California's statutory mandates by limiting the proportion of the
corporation's shares to which any given stockholder's cumulative voting and
removal rights are applicable. 10 2 This obvious route through which the
cagey-or well advised-corporation may evade California's mandate calls
into question the strength of the state's assertion of its interest in mandating
cumulative voting for poorly advised or merely docile corporate subjects.
0 3
These complications aside, the question of removal without cause, like that
of cumulative voting, does not have a right or wrong answer. If directors are
easily removed without cause, as in California, and the removal rights of a
majority of the stockholders cannot be foresworn through charter provisions,
obviously the residual power of a majority of the shares is strengthened as
96. See id. § 303(a)(1).
97. See id. § 204(a)(5) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
98. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(i) (1983).
99. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 301(a) (1977).
100. See id. §§ 202(e)(3), 301(a), 400(a).
101. See Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California General Corporation Law-The
Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations, 23 UCLA L. REv. 1282, 1298-99 (1976).
102. See id. at 1298-1300.
103. See Latty, supra note 14, at 160. Dean Latty argues that "there is not much point in insisting
on application of local law" to a foreign corporation if a domestic corporation could legally
circumvent the statutory requirement because such requirements do not represent strong policies of
the state. See id. But see Kaplan, supra note 37, at 474 (rejecting test equating public policy with
nonevasory statutory requirements because most such features of corporation statutes can effectively
be circumvented). This criticism has force, however, only if one begins with the assumption that it is
desirable that local law be applicable to the internal affairs of foreign corporations.
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against that of the directors. This may appear wise when a majority or
controlling block is sold so that holdover directors may be readily removed or
persuaded to resign by the new majority stockholder. If removal without
cause is less readily available, as in Delaware, directors on balance are more
insulated from the vicissitudes of majority shareholder favor and fancy, and
are more likely to concern themselves with the interests not just of the
majority, but of all the shares. A statutory bias or preference against removal
without cause is not obviously wrongheaded or unfair, and the parties' choice
not to include removal without cause language in the constitutive documents
of a Delaware corporation is again the product of the agreement among
majority stockholders, nonmajority stockholders, and directors about their
respective prerogatives.
States other than Delaware have staked out positions on the removal of
directors that are in irreducible conflict with the California statute. Some
states, including Kansas and New Hampshire, do not permit removal without
cause, shifting Delaware's statutory bias against removal into a prohibition.1
0 4
A corporation incorporated in a state that does not provide for removal
without cause (which one can assume is not the result of an inadvertent
omission by the legislature) cannot consistently comply as well with the
California removal provision made applicable through section 2115.
A final example of irreducible conflict is found between the Delaware and
California indemnification provisions. Suppose that a corporation
incorporated in Delaware is also subject to California's regulation under
section 2115, and that the question in issue is whether the corporation is
obliged to indemnify a corporate officer for expenses incurred in litigation
related to the person's corporate office. Section 121(b) of the Delaware
statute provides that all Delaware corporations shall be "governed by the
provisions and subject to the restrictions and liabilities" in the statute.i0 5
Further, the Delaware statute mandates indemnification to the extent that the
defendant has been successful in defending against the litigation "on the
merits or otherwise."' 0 6 California requires indemnification only to the
extent that the defendant has succeeded "on the merits." 0 7 Conflict between
these indemnification provisions will occur if the particular defendant has
"succeeded" in some fashion other than "on the merits," perhaps by pleading
the statute of limitations or by obtaining the dismissal of a criminal action
after a successful challenge to the legality of a search. The corporation in this
example cannot comply with the inconsistent mandates of both states. The
practical significance of this conflict, however, may be lessened because both
104. Other jurisdictions that do not statutorily authorize removal without cause are Alaska,
Louisiana, South Dakota, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.
Only since July 1, 1984 has Illinois permitted removal without cause. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 8.35 (Smith-Hurd 1984). In Illinois, like California, share classification restricts the shareholders'
right to remove directors elected by their particular class of shares. Id. § 8.35(3).
105. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (1983).
106. Id. § 145(c).
107. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (1977 & Supp. 1984).
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the California and Delaware statutes permit corporations to purchase
insurance against even those liabilities of their agents that the corporation




The conflicts among state statutory provisions described above are in large
part the product of two kinds of differences in legislative goals expressed in
the corporation statutes. First, the statutes differ in their assumptions about
the appropriate norms of internal corporate governance to be imposed by a
statutory standard. For example, states that prohibit removal of directors
without cause (like Kansas) or set the statutory presumption to make removal
more rather than less difficult (like Delaware) effectively strengthen the hand
of directors vis-A-vis that of majority stockholders. States like California that
mandate that directors be removable without cause or that, without granting a
majority of the shares an irrevocable right of removal, set a statutory
presumption of easy removal, effectively strengthen the position of the
majority stockholder vis-A-vis that of the directors.
Less evident, but nonetheless important, are differing conceptions of the
function of the corporation statute and its regulatory potential. The statutory
tradition epitomized by Delaware tends on balance, as the examples above
illustrate, to minimize the role of the state in prescribing specific internal
governance arrangements in preference for validating private parties'
agreements. The standards furnished in the statute to deal with questions like
voting arrangements can be replaced by the parties' own choice; Delaware's
statutory presumption in favor of straight voting may be supplanted by the
parties' election of cumulative voting. This deference to private agreements
represents, in short, a highly contractual view of corporation law: subject to
compliance with fairly minimal statutory requirements, the parties "make
their own law" as in any private contract and are privileged by the state to
operate in corporate form with limited liability.
Notwithstanding the success of the contractualized Delaware model in
attracting incorporations to Delaware and in the statute's appeal as a model
for other states, some jurisdictions have long pursued a somewhat different
conception of the proper function of corporation statutes. Though limited in
number, these jurisdictions support what may well be viewed as a
"counterculture" of corporation law, counter, that is, to the dominant
contractualized approach. These states' statutes tend, quite simply, to be
more unequivocally mandatory or prohibitory on a number of matters and to
use state prescription rather than private agreement as the mechanism for
fleshing out the corporation's internal structure, thereby establishing the
respective powers and rights of its constituents. Behind these statutes lies,
108. See id. § 317(i); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 5 (g) (1983). The popularity of such insurance is
greater among large corporations. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 93, at 969-70.
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perhaps, a relatively optimistic view of the capacity of state prescription to
protect effectively the corporation's creditors and noncontrolling
stockholders and maybe even the public at large.' 0 9
Indeed, some statutes within this countercultural tradition are so
structured as to have limited appeal to organizers of a corporate enterprise,
unless those organizers contemplate a wholly local operation or know from
the start that they wish to strengthen the prerogatives of minority
shareowners in the enterprise. Perhaps the most extreme example of a statute
in this tradition is that of North Carolina. Like the California statute, it
mandates cumulative voting,"10 although the stockholders' right to remove
directors without cause by majority vote may be abrogated through a charter
provision or shareholder bylaw.'i Unlike the California statute, however, the
North Carolina act grants the holders of at least twenty percent of the shares
in closely-held corporations the right to compel the payment in dividends of
one-third of the corporation's earnings." l2 Overall, in the judgment of the
leading authority on the statute, "Practitioners retained by the promoters or
top management of. .. [a publicly-held] company may conclude that the
protective features of the North Carolina statute, although not as strict as they
originally were, still cause too much risk and uncertainty."' '3 To be sure, the
risk of enacting a countercultural corporation statute is that few will elect to
incorporate under it.
The outreach provisions in corporate statutes, along with cases like Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 114 are the choice of law counterpart to this
counterculture in corporation statutes, and as such, they aggrandize the effect
of the remainder of the statute by making it applicable at least in part to
enterprises incorporated elsewhere. Supporters of statutory outreach justify
its applicability to corporations that are truly pseudo-foreign, as well as to
corporations that are less than entirely pseudo-foreign, by arguing that the
appeal of statutes like Delaware's is in some respect illegitimate, or at any rate
readily ignored to give preference to another state's regulatory choice.' 15
Statutory outreach provisions are thus a retaliatory weapon: they are
designed to reduce the appeal of Delaware incorporation by creating the
possibility that another state's corporation law will supplant the law of
Delaware. ' 16
109. For an argument that corporation statutes ought to be used to enable the state to control
corporations' economic power and affronts to the environment, see Comment, Law For Sale: A Study
of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 897-98 (1969). This position,
however, does not establish that corporation statutes are superior to other vehicles for regulating
such matters.
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67(c) (1982).
111. See id. § 55-27(f).
112. See id. § 55-50(1).
113. See R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-3, at 16 (3d ed.
1983); see also Hazen, Book Review, 61 N.C.L. REV. 1256, 1259 (1983).
114. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
115. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 39, at 99-104.
116. See, e.g., Note, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 119, 121 (1976)
(section 2115 as a "means to combat the influence of the permissive states over corporate law");
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The defense of statutory retaliation is vulnerable on a number of counts,
including its empirical presuppositions and the negative implications
regarding state power drawn from the commerce clause of the Constitution.
An image that arises frequently in the anti-Delaware literature is that of bad
law driving out good, described as the "Gresham's Law" effect. 1 7 Delaware
law is the "bad" in this construct, driving out the good of North Carolina and
California, among others. What makes Delaware "bad" to these observers is
the contractual tradition described above; the contractual approach is said to
make the Delaware statute unduly permissive and solicitous of management's
interests at the expense of stockholders, especially minority stockholders.' 18
Management-or controlling stockholders-chooses the site of
incorporation, and by choosing Delaware can systematically advance its
interests over those of minority stockholders. The obvious empirical question
is whether the ability freely to choose the Delaware statutory regimen
produces bad effects. If not, the argument for suppressing the choice of
Delaware through outreach statutes is severely weakened. Investigations
pertinent to this question do not demonstrate that the contractual norm in
Delaware's law has malign consequences.
In order to evaluate the thesis that Delaware incorporation permits
corporate managers to exploit shareholders, one study examined the impact
of reincorporation on the stock market price of corporations that changed
their state of incorporation to Delaware. The study posited that the market
price of corporations electing to reincorporate in Delaware should plummet if
investors view Delaware incorporation as a serious peril to their interests.
The data showed no negative market reaction after Delaware reincorporation,
however. 1 9 To be sure, the significance of this finding is limited because
movements in stock prices necessarily reflect many factors and it is difficult to
isolate the influence of the state of incorporation. Further, the study included
only industrial corporations listed on stock exchanges; the consequences of
Delaware incorporation for other kinds of corporations were not studied.
Nonetheless, one need not possess a Panglossian optimism about the
significance of stock price movements to recognize that the fact of Delaware
Comment, Choice of Corporation Domicile: California or Delaware?, 13 U.S.F. L. REV 103, 104 (1978)
(California's statute "threatened Delaware's unchallenged status as the foremost state for
incorporation"). But cf Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1958, at 193, 207 (advocating protection of state's interest in compliance
with provisions of corporation statutes through regulation administered under aegis of state
securities act).
117. Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579) served as a royal factor, that is, a representative of the
crown to the Antwerp money market. The aphorism known as Gresham's Law, "bad money drives
out good," was not devised by Gresham himself but was instead attributed to him by Henry D.
McLeod, a nineteenth century economist. At most, Gresham stated in his writings that Henry VIII's
debasement of the currency caused the exchange rate to fall, with the result that the export of fine
coins from the realm became profitable and overvalued base money took its place in circulating
currency. See R. DEROOVER, GRESHAM ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE (1949).
118. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
119. See Dodd & Leftwich, 7he ,Vlarket for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal
Regulation, 53J. Bus. 259 (1980).
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incorporation appears not to impede investment in Delaware corporations.
Perhaps potential investors are more interested in other aspects of a
particular corporation, since the profitability of investing in corporations is,
on average, much more heavily influenced by factors such as the quality of the
enterprise's management and product. In any event, no empir ical case has
been rigorously mounted for the attack on the contractualized nature of
Delaware corporate law.'
20
Another difficulty with the defense of statutory retaliation stems from the
nature of the topics dealt with by state corporation statutes, even the relatively
restrictive codes. In the United States, the task of defining standards of
fiduciary behavior has been left to the courts; legislatures seem to enter this
arena primarily to relax, through revisions to the corporation statute, rules
established by the courts to regulate the actions of officers, directors, and
controlling stockholders. 121 Congress has supplanted the fiduciary restraints
for those corporations and transactions subject to the federal securities laws.
State corporation statutes, in contrast, are silent on a number of significant
problems arising out of transactions that appear to call into question the
fiduciaries' loyalty to the corporation. For example, state statutes do not
regulate the ability of fiduciaries to use corporate assets to maintain their
control of the corporation or to cause the corporation to repurchase its stock
at a premium price from selected (and fortunate) stockholders. 22 Indeed,
although both New York and California have statutory channels enabling-
with limitations-the validation of transactions between the corporation and
certain fiduciaries, 123 they are not made applicable to foreign corporations
through the outreach provisions of either statute. The difficulty, in short, is
that the outreach statutes do not address the major offenses of the day against
stockholders' interests and instead focus on matters of relatively less moment.
120. See Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857, 872-83 (1984).
121. See Latty, supra note 79, at 606.
122. See id. at 608. The practice of selected stock repurchases continues to be a problem, now
characterized in the take-over context as "green mail." Stock repurchases at premium prices to buy
out persons who might take over the corporation through a hostile tender offer produced public
outrage in 1984, along with proposed federal legislation. See H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(prohibiting repurchase at above market price from person owning more than three percent of class
of securities to be purchased, unless a majority of issuer's voting securities approves the repurchase,
or unless an equal offer is made to all holders of the class of securities). In 1985, the California Court
of Appeal upheld the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction that effectively imposed a
constructive trust on the proceeds of a green mail transaction; the selling stockholder had
abandoned derivative litigation it brought on behalf of the corporation when it sold its stock back to
the company, thereby, in the Court of Appeal's view, breaching a fiduciary relationship voluntarily
undertaken on behalf of the other stockholders. See Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119,
214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
123. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1984).
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Commerce Clause
Statutory retaliation, as represented by the outreach statutes, is also
problematic in light of the limits on state power implicit in the commerce
clause. The Supreme Court has long interpreted that clause, providing that
"Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States,"'' 24 to mean that states may not directly regulate interstate
commerce but may regulate it indirectly unless the burden imposed on
interstate commerce exceeds the "putative" local benefits of such
regulations. 125
The Supreme Court most recently interpreted the commerce clause as it
pertains to state corporate regulation in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 126 The statute
challenged in Edgar, the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, 127 required that any
tender offer for a target company within the Act's purview be preceded by
twenty days' advance notice to the Illinois Secretary of State and to the
target's management. 28 During the twenty-day period, the Secretary was
empowered to call a hearing to adjudicate the equity of the offer and the
adequacy of the offeror's disclosure.1 29 While the offeror was prohibited from
communicating its offer to target shareholders, target management was free
to contact them concerning the offer.' 30 The statute enabled the Illinois
Secretary of State to block an offer from proceeding anywhere in the nation
upon a finding that the offer was inequitable or fraudulent, or that the offeror
had not complied with the statute's disclosure requirements, and any offeror
who proceeded without compliance was subjected to civil and criminal
penalties.' 3 1 The statute applied to offers for target companies if Illinois
shareholders owned ten percent of the class of securities subject to the offer,
or if any two of three conditions were met: the target had its principal
executive office in Illinois, was incorporated in Illinois, or had at least ten
percent of its capital and paid-in surplus represented within the state. 32 The
Court held that the burden on interstate commerce was unconstitutionally
excessive in relation to the local interests served by the statute, 33 and four
Justices agreed that the statute improperly imposed direct regulation on
interstate tender offers from which interstate transactions would follow.', 4
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
125. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
126. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
127. See Pub. Act No. 80-1421, 1978 Il. Laws 1581 (codified at ILL. REX'. STAT. ch. 121.
137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983)).
128. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 627.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 634-35.
131. Id. at 627.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 640, 643-46.
134. Id. at 641-43 (opinion of White, J.).
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Three justices would also have held that the statute substantially frustrated
the objectives of the Williams Act and was therefore preempted by it. 
3 5
Analysis of the statute's direct restraint on interstate commerce turned on
the fact that the statute on its face purported to apply to the offeror's
communication of its offer to shareholders situated outside Illinois and that
the offer, if accepted, would thus result in transactions in interstate
commerce. If Illinois could impose such a statute, so could other states, and
the interstate commerce produced by tender offers would be "thoroughly
stifled."
136
The Edgar holding, however, was based on the Court's analysis of the
Illinois statute as an indirect regulation of interstate commerce. Illinois
regulation would burden interstate commerce, the Court observed, because
permitting the Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer would
deprive stockholders, among others, of the benefits stemming from the
offer.' 37 In the balance, Illinois had argued that its statute furthered the local
interests of protecting resident Illinois investors and regulating the internal
affairs of Illinois corporations. 138 The Court dismissed these asserted local
interests; the statute's applicability to non-Illinois corporations and
corporations without Illinois shareholders belied the state's asserted
purpose,139 while the statute's provisions to protect shareholders substantially
duplicated those of the Williams Act. 140 Finally, insofar as the statute applied
to corporations not incorporated in Illinois and with their principal places of
business in other states, the Court observed that "Illinois has no interest in
regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations."'
4 1
Much in Edgar appears to be pertinent to the choice of law statutes
discussed above. Preliminarily, however, it is useful to isolate one factor
present in Edgar but not in the corporate choice of law problem, namely, the
substantial federal presence in tender offer regulation created by Congress
through the Williams Act in 1968. To what extent does the presence of
relatively comprehensive federal regulation limit Edgar's significance as a
135. Id. at 630-40 (opinion of White, J.).
136. Id. at 642.
137. Id. at 643. Part of Justice White's reasoning has been trenchantly criticized by Professor
Richard Buxbaum, who rightly observes that the opinion unnecessarily conjoins the commerce clause
to "an institutionally and theoretically unsupportable version of the efficient capital market
hypothesis." See Buxbaum, Corporate Ligitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
515, 534 (1984). One passage injustice White's opinion, for example, asserts that the mechanism of
hostile tender offers affords incumbent corporate management incentives to perform well and to
reallocate corporate assets to their highest valued use. See 401 U.S. at 643-44. As Professor
Buxbaum observes, another hypothesis supported by available evidence is that many hostile takeover
bids are simply redistributive events that shift wealth from one group of stockholders to another but
are unrelated to efficiency considerations. See Buxbaum, supra, at 533-34.
138. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
139. Id. at 645-46.
140. Id. at 644-45.
141. Id. at 645-46. Althodgh critical of the Court's commerce clause analysis in Edgar, Professor
Buxbaum has conceded nonetheless that a state could not constitutionally regulate a tender offer
simply because one shareholder resides in the state. See Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82
Micti. 1L. REV. 1163, 1173-74 (1984).
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reading of the commerce clause? The existence of the Williams Act enters the
Court's analysis only insofar as it affects the local benefit derived from Illinois
regulation; beyond that, Edgar may be read to postulate that state regulation
of tender offers, at least in the grand style of Illinois, would be
unconstitutional even in the absence of any federal regulation.
Moreover, the Court prior to Edgar has held unconstitutional on
commerce clause grounds state statutes that, in the absence of federal
regulation, burdened interstate commerce by placing interstate firms under
inconsistent regulatory mandates. For example, in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 142 the Court struck down an Illinois statute requiring the use of
contoured rear fender mudflaps on trucks and trailers operating within that
state because forty-five states permitted the use of conventional or "straight"
mudflaps, and Arkansas (adjacent to Illinois) required straight mudflaps.
Further, switching mudflaps on trucks entering or leaving Illinois would
impose a significant delay of at least two hours. The Court held that even if
the mudflap design mandated by Illinois was in isolation a reasonable exercise
of the state's police power, its idiosyncratic nature imposed a burden on
interstate commerce by subjecting carriers to inconsistent regulatory
obligations that were constitutionally impermissible. 143 Bibb, read against
Edgar, means that the absence of federal regulatory involvement in itself does
not limit the applicability of the commerce clause to state regulations and that
the significant question is whether those regulations, inconsistent with each
other or not, unduly burden interstate commerce.
Assessing the validity of these "outreach" choice of law doctrines under
the commerce clause thus requires that a number of questions be addressed:
(1) to what extent does the application of local corporate law to internal affairs
questions in foreign corporations involve the regulation of interstate
commerce; (2) if interstate commerce is thereby regulated, is it regulated
directly or only incidentally; (3) if the regulation is incidental, does it burden
interstate commerce; (4) if interstate commerce is burdened by the regulation,
is the burden disproportionate to any legitimate local interests furthered by
the regulation? Although answering some of these questions is far from easy,
the analytic process demonstrates considerable constitutional vulnerability in
the "outreach" approach.
It is clear from Edgar that to be invalid under the commerce clause a
statute need not impose regulation directly on interstate transactions in goods
and services. The tender offers regulated by the Illinois statute in that case
were one step removed from transactions in securities that would only occur
once the offer was accepted by shareholders. Thus, the statute's propensity to
affect interstate commerce is the relevant criterion.
A number of such effects seem likely under the "outreach" schemes. First,
the applicability of the California and New York provisions turns on factors
142. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
143. Id. at 529-30.
Page 161: Summer 1985]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
that probably implicate interstate commerce. Whether a foreign corporation
does business or has assets or an executive office situated within a state are
factors within the corporation's control. If the applicability of particular
internal affairs rules turns on these matters, a corporation may choose to do
less business within a state or locate its offices and principal assets elsewhere.
These self-protective decisions a fortiori involve transactions in interstate
commerce. Second, some of the internal affairs provisions of corporation
statutes made applicable to foreign corporations through the "outreach"
effect themselves involve transactions in interstate commerce. Under section
2115 of the California Corporations Code, for example, the statute's
provisions regulating dividends are made applicable to foreign corporations,
and surely the payment of a dividend by a foreign corporation from California
assets to a non-California stockholder is a transaction in interstate commerce.
Nonetheless, the one California case to focus on this particular question
arrived at a different answer. In Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., 144 the Court of
Appeal dismissed appellant corporation's challenge to the constitutionality of
section 1600 of the Corporations Code, which required that a foreign
corporation with executive offices situated in California comply with the
Corporations Code's provision on shareholders' inspection rights. The court
dismissed appellant's commerce clause argument with the observation that
section 1600 did not affect interstate commerce because the corporation had
been unable to show any relationship between its ability to do business in
more than one state and its duty to provide a shareholder list.I45 But the
relevant question under the Supreme Court precedents appears to be whether
the regulation may have some impact on interstate commerce and not simply
on the business locations or interstate sales of products by the firm. The
implication from section 1600, that its mandate can be avoided if the company
relocated its executive offices outside California, would seemingly affect
interstate commerce, at least commerce in executive offices and their
accouterments! In any event, it is much more difficult to argue that the full
range of California regulation made applicable to foreign corporations
through section 2115 would not have some effect on interstate commerce,
most notably so in the case of dividends, merger regulation, and
shareholders' appraisal rights.
Some of the same aspects of these outreach provisions that can be seen to
"affect" interstate commerce appear also to amount to the direct regulation of
interstate commerce and, indeed, of transactions taking place wholly outside
the state's boundaries. Section 2115, for example, purports to make
California dividend regulation applicable to a foreign corporation's payment
of dividends from non-California bank accounts to non-California
shareholders. Such a result may exemplify the direct regulation of
Iransactions in interstate commerce toward which the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause is especially hostile.
14-1. 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
145. Id. at 808-09, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
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The question of burden on interstate commerce appears not to be
completely independent of the question of effect on it. Thus, to the extent
that a statute discourages interstate transactions, it both affects and burdens
commerce. Moreover, the Supreme Court's interpretations suggest some
additional meaning for-the burden criterion. As noted earlier, the Court in
Bibb declared that state rules imperimissibly burden interstate commerce if
they impose mutually inconsistent regulatory burdens on the parties subject
to them, or if the costs of complying with both regulatory obligations are
substantial. Curiously, the most recent California case to consider the
constitutionality of section 2115 gave short shrift to these questions. In Wilson
v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 146 the Court of Appeal held that section 2115
was not unconstitutional in its application of California's Code provision
mandating cumulative voting to a Utah corporation that had not elected
cumulative voting in preference to the straight voting structure contained in
the Utah corporation statute. The court observed that the criteria specified in
section 2115 minimized the "potential for conflict and resulting
uncertainty,"' 47 and that even "[i]f California's statute were replicated in all
states, no conflict would result"' 4 8 because section 2115 is not applicable
unless a majority of a corporation's business is done in the state.
One difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it ignores entirely the
conflict between the California statute and the Utah statute under which the
company was incorporated. Utah's statute enables the parties to choose the
applicable voting rule."49 It further provides that corporations created under
it are "subject to the provisions of this act,"'150 including the provision that
[u]nless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide, at each election for
directors every shareholder entitled to vote . . . shall have the right to vote
• . . the number of shares owned by him for as many persons as there are
directors to be elected ....... 151 True, the conflict in Wilson is not as
melodramatic as a conflict between California's statute and one prohibiting
cumulative voting, but that does not mean there is no conflict, or that it
should be ignored by the court. Although it is possible under the Utah statute
for the corporation's charter to be amended by the shareholders and the
146. 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982).
147. Id. at 226-27, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
148. Id. at 227, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The court observed in Wilson that no serious impact on
corporations resulted from the New York provisions applicable to foreign corporations. Id. at 227
n.7, 187 Cal. Rptr at 860 n.7. The New York experience is somewhat beside the point in light of the
substantial differences between New York's and California's "outreach" provisions. See supra text
accompanying notes 17-32.
149. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-31 (1973).
150. Id. § 16-10-2(a) (Supp. 1983).
151. Id. § 16-10-31. The court's observation in Wilson that "Utah . . . has no interests which
are offended by cumulative voting," 138 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857, ignores Utah's
interest in the enforcement of the statutory provisions quoted in the text. Perhaps the court assumed
in Wilson that only states mandating or prohibiting cumulative voting articulate a relevant state interest.
If so, that assumption reflects a fairly narrow conception of the nature of corporation statutes, which
is inconsistent with some of the academic writing on this topic. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 37, at 474-
75.
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directors, 52 that mechanical fact does not establish California's right to
coerce such an amendment.
In Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., there was an even more palpable conflict
between state statutes. Under section 1600(a) of the California Corporations
Code, a shareholder holding at least five percent of a corporation's voting
shares has an absolute right to obtain a shareholder list for the corporation,
regardless of his reasons for wanting the list.153 In contrast, under title 8,
section 220(b) of the Delaware Code, while any shareholder regardless of the
size of his holdings may demand to inspect (and presumably copy) the
shareholder list, only those shareholders with a "proper purpose" have the
right to inspect. 54 "Proper purpose" is defined by the Delaware statute to be
"a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder,"i 5 5
and would not authorize inspection to obtain a list to sell or solely to enable
the stockholder to compete in business with the corporation.
56
The Valtz court ignored the significance of the conflict between the
California and Delaware provisions, observing that the "internal affairs"
doctrine was inapplicable because the inspection rights granted by section
1600 of the California Code were rights incidental to the ownership of stock
and affected "the relationship between corporation and shareholder," thereby
subjecting those rights to regulation by the state where the corporation does
business.i 57 To be sure, "doing business" is not the test posed by section
1600(d) for its applicability to foreign corporations, 58 but in any case this
conception of the nature of the matter being regulated potentially applies to
all internal affairs questions as well, for they all surely concern at some point
the relationship between a corporation and its stockholders. The more
important point is that through section 1600, California purports to regulate
the inspection rights even of non-California stockholders and ignores the
initial and continuing expectations of parties who chose to incorporate in
Delaware, which more carefully regulates the exercise of inspection rights.
The indifference to the expectations of parties who chose to incorporate in
Delaware reflected in sections 1600 and 2115 of the California Corporations
Code is especially troubling given facts like those in Valtz. In that case, the
two stockholders seeking to exercise inspection rights were among the five
founding stockholders of the corporation, which was in the business of
manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing prescription eyewear. The plaintiffs
subsequently established and operated a competing chain of retail eyeglass
stores and were discharged from their corporate offices. After demanding
152. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-55 (1973).
153. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1983).
155. Id.
156. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 253 (1972).
157. See Valtz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 807, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
158. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600(d) (West 1977 & Supp. 1984) (applicable to foreign
corporation "having its principal executive office in this state or customarily holding meetings of its
board in this state").
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detailed business information from the corporation, they demanded to
inspect the shareholder records. The corporation's management alleged that
the demand for the shareholder list was part of a strategy to harass the
company's management, motivated by the plaintiffs' competing business
interests.159 In any event, it is hard to argue that two founding stockholders
of a five-stockholder corporation were not participants in the creation of the
other stockholders' expectations that the company would be subject to the
statute under which it was incorporated, which was Delaware, or that the
results of California's regulation of interstockholder relationships through
section 1600 are self-evidently superior to those of the Delaware approach.
The final consideration under commerce clause analysis is the relative
weight of the burdens imposed by these conflicting obligations and the
legitimate local benefits yielded by the outreach doctrine. Both Valtz and
Wilson emphasize that the corporations in those cases were unable to
demonstrate any impact on their businesses or interstate transactions
resulting from California's claim to regulate their internal affairs. But this
focus seems unduly and inappropriately narrow. An assessment of the
relative burdens and benefits produced by corporation statutes should take
into account the uncertainties and resulting costs that conflicting regulation
imposes on the corporation in planning and attempting voluntarily to
conform its behavior to the law, as well as the costs or burdens that may be
apparent only after litigation occurs. Corporations are, from the formal
standpoint of state corporation statutes, creatures of paper: "The
'corporation' itself is born, lives, and dies all by and upon paper; when it eats,
sweats, emotes, gets buried-'it' emits paper."1 60 Subjecting a corporation to
the strictures of conflicting corporation statutes requires the production of
more paper, and more expensive paper at that. Thus, the relevant concern is
not simply the impact of the regulation on the corporation's business
transactions, but rather the impact on its total costs of operating under
conflicting regulatory obligations.' 6' Costs such as additional attorney's
159. See Brief for Appellants at 2-8, Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 923 (1983). Facts like these cast doubt on the assumption that statutes which do not condition
inspection on a showing of "proper purpose" are more "stringent" or "protective" than those which
do. See Latty, supra note 14, at 162 & n.l 13. As the facts of Valtz suggest, statutes that confer an
unqualified right to inspect may operate to "protect" the interest of one shareholder faction at the
expense of injury to other shareholders or to the company's business activities.
160. Latty, supra note 79, at 601.
161. One authority has argued that a guiding principle in applying the commerce clause to
questions like these is that when more than one state has an interest in the application of its law, the
Court should apply the law which would best facilitate interstate commercial transactions. See
Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REv. 806, 814
(1971). Under this test, internal affairs questions arising in corporations with widely dispersed
stockholders should be subject to the law of a single jurisdiction. Id. at 814-19. This jurisdiction
need not be the state of incorporation, however, which may not have a "significant interest in having
its policy prevail, if no members or shareholders reside there, and if no corporate business is done
there." Id. at 819-20. But these factors for justifying the application of the law of a state other than
that of the state of incorporation slight the formal and contractual significance of the decision to
incorporate in a particular state. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 89.
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services for advice regarding the corporation's position under the California
statute should be pertinent.
More ephemeral, perhaps, are the local interests furthered -by outreach
doctrines. In some respects, the California courts appear to assume that the
application of California substantive law, in itself, is a worthy social good,
even in the face of conflicting applicable law from other jurisdictions. 162 This
assumption is especially untenable when applied to statutes that purport to
regulate activities occurring outside the state or affecting non-California
residents. In addition, it is difficult to justify as a "legitimate local interest"
the strategy of reducing the attractiveness of out-of-state incorporation
through choice of law doctrines, particularly those that purport to regulate
the non-California activities of corporations that are far from being true
pseudo-foreign entities. Further, the ease with which some of the mandatory
provisions may be evaded vitiates the strength of California's local interest in
the imposition of the corporate rules made applicable to foreign corporations
through section 2115. If the statutory mandate of cumulative voting may be
easily avoided by the device of using different classes of stock, it is hard to see
why California has an especially strong claim to have its cumulative voting
rule applied to foreign corporations too hapless to have evaded the
requirement. Likewise, the permissibility of insurance reduces the strength of
the asserted local interest behind the strict indemnification rules, as does the
statutory exception from section 2115 for corporations registered on national
stock exchanges. Avoiding some of these rules might reduce the burden their
imposition creates for foreign corporations, but the burden is, perhaps, not
entirely eliminated: determining that a corporation is subject to a rule,
determining that the rule may be evaded, and then executing the evasion all
represent "more paper"-increased costs to the corporation in a field of the
law that is largely enforced through private planning and accommodation.
B. Full Faith and Credit to State Interests and Parties' Expectations
The full faith and credit clause, in conjunction with the due process clause,
provides a further constitutional dimension to the outreach doctrines.
Section 1 of article IV provides that "full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state," 63 and the fourteenth amendment prohibits states from depriving
persons of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 64 These
sections suggest two questions about outreach doctrines and statutes: first,
do these clauses permit the application of an outreach statute as local law by a
court in the enacting jurisdiction or do they prohibit this application as an
unconstitutional affront to the law of the state of incorporation; and second,
162. Cf Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1983) (holding in
part that contractual choice of law provision violated state policy against permitting waivers that
made inapplicable California's Corporate Securities Law).
163. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Vol . 48: No. 3
PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE OF LAW
do these sections require that courts of other jurisdictions-such as the state
of incorporation-apply the outreach statute in preference to the corporation
law of the state of incorporation?
In its application of both of these clauses to choice of law questions, the
Supreme Court has examined the sufficiency of the contacts between the state
whose law was applied and the parties and events involved in the litigation,
requiring the choice of the law of states with "a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 65 Only very rarely, and
in extreme circumstances, has the Court invalidated a forum's decision to
apply its own state's law to a controversy.' 66 Thus, the answer to the second
question set forth above is quite likely to be that application of the outreach
statutes by courts of other states is not constitutionally mandated, at least so
long as the state whose law is applied has some contact with the corporation.
Incorporation should suffice to create such a contact.'
67
The answer to the first question turns on whether the state whose outreach
statute is applied has sufficient contacts with the parties and occurrences in
the lawsuit to make application of its law "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair." The Court interpreted the full faith and credit and due process
constraints on choice of law recently in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. 168 In a
plurality opinion, the Court upheld the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice to
apply a Minnesota insurance rule permitting "stacking" of uninsured motorist
coverage amounts to an accident case with which, although Minnesota had
contacts, Wisconsin had more numerous and obvious contacts. Decedent was
a Wisconsin resident as were the operators of both motor vehicles involved in
the accident in which decedent met his death as a passenger, and decedent's
insurance policies were delivered in Wisconsin. 169 The Minnesota contacts
identified by the Court as sufficient to justify selection of Minnesota law by the
Minnesota Supreme Court were that decedent worked in Minnesota and
commuted there daily (although the accident did not occur while decedent
was commuting to work), that decedent's insurance company did business in
Minnesota, and that decedent's surviving spouse moved to Minnesota prior to
beginning the litigation.' 70 Minnesota, held the Court, "had a sufficient
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state
interests, such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." 17 The contacts between a foreign corporation and a
165. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
166. E.g. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
167. For example, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), although the Court invalidated
Delaware's sequestration procedure as a basis for Delaware's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants, it recognized the propriety of applying Delaware law to substantive issues concerning
officers' and directors' liability in the action. Id. at 215 & n.44.
168. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
169. Id. at 305-06.
170. Id. at 313-19.
171. Id. at 320.
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state required to trigger the outreach doctrines appear well within the
sufficiency of state contacts sanctioned by Hague.
One obvious consequence of the Court's liberality in Hague is that more
than one state might be able, from the perspective of the full faith and credit
clause, to apply its corporate law constitutionally to the internal affairs of a
particular corporation.172 Although the conflicts that can readily result from
the overlapping application of state corporate statutes may be objectionable
under the commerce clause, the question remains whether the same conflicts
would be similarly troublesome under the full faith and credit clause. The
only intimation that the full faith and credit clause mandates a choice of law
approach that results in a uniform or at least consistent set of legal rules
applicable to the internal affairs of business organizations appears in early
twentieth century cases dealing with fraternal benefit societies. In those cases,
the Court took the position that the validity of bylaws and organizational acts
affecting members' rights and duties must be determined by the law of a
single state in light of the complexity of the relationships created by such a
fraternal organization. 173 The reasoning in these cases, however, appears to
have been influenced by the view of choice of laws that placed great emphasis
on a state's territorial connection with events and persons, 174 a view many
now regard as anachronistic.' 75 In any event, the Court's more contemporary
readings of the full faith and credit clause do not echo the necessity for
uniformity found in the fraternal benefit cases, although differences in subject
matter rather than in doctrine may well explain this failure. 176
The remaining relevance of the full faith and credit clause to these
questions stems instead from its mandate that states give recognition to
172. Delaware's Supreme Court has acknowledged this possibility pessimistically. See
Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 177 (Del. 1980) (upholding constitutionality of statute
treating acceptance of directorship in Delaware corporation as consent to suits in Delaware arising
out of such service).
173. See, e.g., Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925); Supreme Council of
the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1915).
174. See, e.g., Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) ("The act of
becoming a member is something more than a contract-it is entering into a complex and abiding
relation-and as marriage looks to domicil, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of
the state granting the incorporation."). The Court used the same reasoning in Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1935), to invalidate a NewJersey statute that would have barred the use of the
New Jersey courts to enforce assessments against shareholders made under the statutory directives of
another state. Indeed, Broderick speaks of the stockholders' "voluntarily assumed statutory
obligation," id. at 644, created when they became stockholders, which makes their liability
"contractual in character." Id. at 643.
175. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-15 (1982).
176. One suggestion that the Court may continue to regard uniformity as a necessary aspect of
regulation of corporate internal affairs appears in Shaffer v. Heitner. After acknowledging that
Delaware law could properly be applied to the substantive questions in the action, the Court
observed that generally the law of the state of incorporation is held to govern the internal affairs of
corporations and that while section 2115 of the California Corporations Code is to the contrary,
"[t]he rationale for the general rule appears to be based more on the need for a uniform and certain
standard to govern the internal affairs of a corporation than on the perceived interest of the state of
incorporation." 433 U.S. at 215 n.44. Unlike the old fraternal benefit cases, however, this statement
may not accredit the need for uniformity with a constitutional basis and it may suggest that the need
for uniformity varies with the nature of the controversy.
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judgments entered in courts of other states. Assuming that the court issuing
the judgment properly had jurisdiction over the parties and the controversy,
the full faith and credit clause ensures that foreign courts' judgments will be
recognized by other states. 177 As applied to the outreach statutes, this aspect
of full faith and credit dogma reduces all original questions essentially to a
race to the courthouse-the first plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the relevant defendants and a judgment in the forum with the version of
corporate law favoring his side of the dispute should prevail in the face of
litigation over the same controversy in other jurisdictions.
178
The result is that the law applicable to a question of corporate internal
affairs may well turn on where an action is brought to resolve the question
through litigation. A key question is whether this result is any more vexing or
problematic for questions of corporate law than for other areas of the law, in
which the outcome of litigation also appears in many instances to turn on its
location.' 79 Indeed, there are aspects of the functions assumed by corporate
laws which make this result troublesome.
First, corporation statutes are applied, and complied with, without resort
to litigation, except in very rare instances. Persons associated with the
corporation determine the requirements of the statutes through private
lawyers' opinions, rather than through litigation. An approach suggesting
that conflicts among corporation statutes can be resolved through litigation in
a sympathetic forum thus appears to be oblivious to the minimal role that
litigation plays in compliance with corporation statutes. Indeed, the subject
matter of much corporate law litigation-shareholders' liability for corporate
debts, authority of purported corporate agents to bind the entity, successor
corporations' liability for predecessor corporations' obligations, the propriety
of fiduciaries' activities-is not addressed by the outreach statutes. Second,
many of the topics that are dealt with by the outreach statutes involve
recurrent matters rather than isolated events and ongoing relationships rather
than one-shot encounters. Rules prescribing methods of shareholder voting,
for example, must be applied for each shareholder meeting. Thus, the number
of times in which participants in a corporation may need to determine the
applicable law could be considerable, in contrast with more typical one-event
situtations (like automobile mishaps) in which choice of law predicaments also
arise. Third, resolving uncertainties about the applicable corporate law rule
through litigation is not free because, win or lose, the corporate defendant
pays its own attorney fees. Even "winning" imposes these and other costs of
litigation on the corporate defendant in most instances. Ultimately, these
177. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 175, at 933-34.
178. In one California case, for example, a California Superior Court first held in an unreported
decision that section 2115 of the California Corporations Code was unconstitutional on full faith and
credit and commerce clause grounds in its regulation of the voting practices of foreign corporations.
A Delaware court in the same litigation subsequently held that in light of the California court's
determination, Delaware law applied. See H. HENN, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 222-23 n.54 (1983).
179. See B. CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAw 188, 281 (1963).
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costs are borne by all of the corporation's stockholders, many of whom might
well assume that the corporation's internal affairs are governed by the law of
the state of incorporation, or at least might prefer that they be, given the cost
of the alternatives.
One question left unaddressed by the plurality opinion in Hague is whether
express or implicit indications of the parties' intentions should be given weight
in assessing the constitutionality of choice of law determinations. Although
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Hague intimated that a court's choice of
law may violate the due process clause because it frustrates "the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties,"' 8 0 no express or implicit indication
of the parties' expectations about the law that would govern their relationship
appeared in the facts of that case. Indeed, the insurance policies involved in
Hague covered accidents throughout the United States,' 8 ' suggesting that the
parties did not have an exclusive expectation that the law of any one state
would govern claims made under the policies. One might well wonder
whether the choice to incorporate in a particular state should be viewed in this
framework as an indication of the parties' contractual intention that they (and
their successors as shareowners) be bound as to internal affairs questions by
the corporation law of that state, and if so interpreted, whether this statement
of intention is protected by notions of due process.
The Court in 1985 further explored the constraints imposed on states'
choice of law decisions by the due process and full faith and credit clauses in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 182 Although the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Kansas class action statute applicable to nonresident
plaintiffs in a nationwide class action to recover interest on delayed royalty
payments, it held that the determination by the Supreme Court of Kansas that
Kansas law applied to all plaintiffs' claims was so arbitrary and unfair as to
exceed constitutional limits on choice of law.' 83 In the Court's view, Kansas
lacked sufficient contact with the plaintiffs' claims to justify application of its
law because 99% of the gas leases involved in the litigation and 97% of the
plaintiffs lacked any connection with Kansas apart from the litigation and
because the law of other states connected with the litigation-notably Texas
and Oklahoma-arguably conflicted with Kansas law. 184 Further, the Court
disparaged the argument that members of the plaintiff class, by not opting out
of the lawsuit, consented to the application of Kansas law, noting that the
plaintiffs' desire for forum law is not dispositive; nor did the fact that Kansas
was adjudicating a nationwide class action enhance its ability to apply its own
law. An aspect of fairness singled out by the Court's opinion is the parties'
expectations: in the context of the events underlying the litigation, the parties
had "no idea that Kansas law would control," making the subsequent
180. 449 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 329.
182. 53 U.S.L.W. 4879 (U.S., June 25, 1985).
183. Id. at 4885-86.
184. Id. at 4884-85.
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application of Kansas law unfair. 185 Thus, Phillips Petroleum develops further
the suggestion in Allstate Insurance that, although states have considerable
latitude in choice of law determinations, parties' expectations can limit that
discretion.
To be sure, the idea that the decision to incorporate is one that expresses
contractual intentions and creates contractual expectations is far from
pervasive in the case law and scholarly literature addressing the pertinent
choice of law question. The interests on which this body of doctrine focuses
are those of states, not private parties.' 86 In the California cases testing the
constitutionality of section 2115, therefore, the court's purview was limited to
assessing against the interests of California in the enforcement of its
mandantory statutory provisions, the lesser interests of the state of
incorporation. In Valtz, for example, the court examined whether the
satisfaction of California's interest in the enforcement of its provision
granting unqualified access to shareholder lists would require the corporation
to violate Delaware law, determined that it would not, and concluded further
that no need for a uniform standard to govern the question had been
demonstrated. 8 7 This analytic approach evidently gives no weight at all to
the parties' expectations or contractual interests created by the decision to
incorporate in a particular state. Likewise, in Wilson, the court determined
that California's interests in the application of its cumulative voting rule to
foreign corporations outweighed the interests of Utah, the state of
incorporation, concluding that Utah had "no interests which are offended by
cumulative voting." "'
Idiosyncratic as the thought may be from the standpoint of the
contemporary thinking about choice of law,' 8 9 these cases might simply ask
the wrong question; perhaps the "interests" properly to be vindicated in these
disputes are those represented by the contractual choices of private parties
rather than the governmental interests of the state. Valtz and Wilson involve
disputes among groups of shareholders and managers, and only a curiously
disembodied view of such litigation understands it to concern conflicts among
sovereign states rather than private parties. 190 Focusing on which state is
185. Id. at 4886.
186. For example, Professor Kirgis analyzes the propriety of statutes like section 2115 of the
California Corporations Code in terms of which state has a greater interest in resolving matters such
as internal affairs questions. See Kirgis, supra note 1, at 141 (referring to "overwhelmingly
interested" state in contrast to state of incorporation); cf. Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism:
Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813 (1984) (discussing difficulties in
defining states' interests).
187. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
188. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
189. But see Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1.
190. The nagging sense that, after all, perhaps writers in this area have been asking and
answering the wrong question-wrong in the sense of beside the point-was well expressed (albeit in
a different context) by H.A. Prichard in his 1912 essay, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest On A Mistake?"
Prichard wrote:
Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense
of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather
than diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular
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"interested in" or has the "greater interest" in regulating such matters
ignores the fact that the occasion for any state's interest in such questions
stems from the prior choices of private parties and undercuts the significance
of those choices.
Even if the question to be addressed is the respective interest of various
states in the application of their corporation statutes to a particular
controversy, a somewhat different casting of state or governmental interest is
appropriate. A strong governmental interest ignored by cases like Valtz and
Wilson and by much of the academic literature on this topic is the interest of
the state of incorporation in the enforcement of private parties' agreements
that are permitted or validated by that statute. Of course, to recognize such
an interest as decisive or even weighty is to recognize and validate the
overwhelmingly private nature of the realm of corporate law, but to do so
would be consistent with the highly contractualized view of corporation law
that dominates the contemporary view of the subject.
Finally, one might wonder about the appropriate forum for this
"recognition." The late Brainerd Currie argued forcefully that the Supreme
Court should not choose the asserted interest of one state over that of
another, apart from determining whether an asserted state policy had any
validity or constitutional significance. In Currie's view, to make such a choice
was properly the function of Congress.' 9' Thus, if it is conceded that states
with outreach statutes have any valid interest in their application, should the
decision to subordinate that interest to the interests of the state of
incorporation be left to Congress? One might, of course, argue that the state
interests created in the state of incorporation by the parties' decision to
incorporate there are self-evident (and perhaps sui generis) trump cards that
can be furthered without doing violence to a proper conception of the judicial
function. Alternatively, the Court might conclude that the statutory
predicates for applicability of the outreach provisions, which in each statute
are geared to whether the corporation is "doing business" in the state, are
insufficiently connected to the internal affairs provisions imposed on foreign
corporations to create any valid state interest. A final possibility for the
resolution of these difficulties is the enactment of a federal corporation statute
to displace state corporate laws, at least on the points at which they are in
thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes
increasingly obscure. 'What', it is asked, 'are we really going to learn by Moral Philosophy?'
'What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show?, and when their aim is clear, why are
they so unconvincing and artificial?' And again: 'Why is it so difficult to substitute anything
better?' Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether
the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt
to answer an improper question. And in this article I shall venture to contend that the existence
of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake . . ..
See H.A. PRICHARD, Does Moral Philosophy Rest On A Mistake?, in MORAL OBLIGATION: ESSAYS AND
LECTURES 1 (1949).
Prichard's "vague sense of dissatisfaction" seems to be an irresistible response to attempts to
elicit and compare state interests in the regulation of corporate internal affairs, perhaps precisely
because these efforts are directed to the wrong question.
191. See B. CURRIE, supra note 179, at 277-78.
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conflict. The content of any federal statutory solution, however, would not
necessarily be consistent with those statutes in the countercultural tradition
discussed above, for, oddly enough, the political impetus toward federal
incorporation as a response to conflicting state statutes could more likely than




Although the preceding discussion suggests that outreach statutes may be
problematic from the standpoint of both the commerce clause and the full
faith and credit clause, the analysis under each clause tends to emphasize
different factors and to proceed with a slightly different focus. While the
commerce clause analysis concentrates on the observable effect of the statute
in place, that is, on the burdens imposed on interstate commerce and the local
benefits generated by the regulation, the full faith and credit perspective is
more abstract, examining the validity of the interests of a given state in having
its law apply to a particular situation. Thus, it is conceivable that, even if some
valid state interest supports the application of a state's law under the full faith
and credit analysis, the actual effects of that application might burden
interstate commerce disproportionately to the local benefits produced, so that
the law would be invalidated by the commerce clause. Likewise, aspects of
outreach regulation assume different significances under the two analyses.
For example, the fact that the impact of some mandatory aspects of a
corporation statute can be evaded through legal bylaw and charter provisions
is, from the standpoint of the commerce clause analysis, probably a neutral
factor. Although the fact that some such requirements can be avoided
suggests that the burden they impose on interstate commerce may not be too
great, the costs of designing and executing the evasive mechanisms should
also be relevant to commerce clause analysis. On the other hand, under the
full faith and credit analysis, the possibility that a requirement may legally be
evaded by a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation subject to an
outreach statute vitiates the force of a state's claim that imposition of the
requirement to any foreign corporation is supported by strong local policy
concerns.
Apart from general constitutional challenges to all aspects of outreach
statutes, it is evident that the vexations (constitutionally offensive and
otherwise) created by such statutes vary depending on the range of
corporations to which they are applicable and the nature of the local
corporate law provisions imposed on foreign corporations. Applying local
law to the "truly pseudo-foreign" corporation that has all its business dealings
in that state and all stockholders resident there, is in practical terms a
different proposition from the application of local law to a foreign corporation
with some local contacts accompanied by dispersed business activities and
stockholders. In the first instance, the stockholders might even fairly
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anticipate that local law could be applicable to their corporate relationships,
while that expectation seems less likely for the less locally concentrated
enterprise.
The functional impact of applying various aspects of local corporate law to
foreign corporations also varies greatly. Whether the application of local law
affects only the validity of one transaction or the validity of the internal
corporate mechanisms which govern many transactions is relevant. Applying
local law to determine the effectiveness of a (locally resident) stockholder's
grant of an irrevocable proxy to another person to vote his stock, for example,
is less likely to be troublesome than applying local law to assess the validity of
a corporate bylaw dealing with voting or share transfers. The first application
of local law affects one transaction which amounts- to a private noncorporate
action of one stockholder, while the second application may affect many
transactions, some which may not have any local connections. Likewise,
aspects of local corporate law the primary significance of which arises in the
context of litigation-such as controls on the indemnification of defendants'
litigation expenses-seem less disruptive as applied to foreign corporations
than do corporate law provisions that do not typically emerge in litigation,
such as shareholder voting rules. True, contested shareholder meetings and
elections may result in litigation, but the bulk do not, and compelling resort to
litigation to determine the applicable voting structure is for that reason not
appealing.
Finally, a state's claim to apply local law to foreign corporations seems
strongest when the matter to be regulated directly affects the interests of local
creditors, as does the legal propriety of dividends. The claim is least strong
where only the relationships of stockholders inter sese are implicated.
Outreach statutes are most likely to be constitutionally inoffensive to the
extent that they purport to regulate only "truly pseudo-foreign" corporations
and to the extent that the provisions of local law made applicable to foreign
corporations are those implicating the interests of local creditors or
regulating isolated events and intrastate transactions.
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